Abstract
Background: Southeast Asia is often portrayed as an arena in which China and the Unite d States compete for influence. This framing can obscure the region’s own preferences for strategic autonomy, diversified partnerships, and ASEAN-centered cooperation. Objective: This paper recons tructs the 2026 State of Southeast Asia Survey to examine how regional policy stakeholders disting uish influence from trust, evaluate major-power competition, and define ASEAN’s preferred respon se. Methods: The ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute conducted a fully online mixed-purposive survey from 5 January to 20 February 2026. The questionnaire contained 43 non-b ranching questions and was offered in seven languages. A total of 2,008 knowledgeable respondents from all 11 ASEAN member states participated across academia, business, civil society/media, gov ernment, and regional or international organizations. Equal country weights were used for regional aggregates. Results: China was identified as Southeast Asia’s most influential economic power by 5 5.9%, compared with 15.3% for the United States and 13.2% for ASEAN. China was also the leadin g political-strategic power at 40.0%, followed by the United States at 29.9% and ASEAN at 15.3%. Recognition did not equal approval: 55.4% worried about China’s economic influence and 66.1% w orried about its political-strategic influence; 53.8% and 56.8%, respectively, worried about US influ ence. ASEAN’s growing political-strategic influence was welcomed by 68.1%. When asked how A SEAN should manage rivalry, 55.2% prioritized resilience and unity, 24.1% favored continued nona lignment, 14.4% sought third parties, and only 6.3% said ASEAN should choose a major power. Un der a separate forced-choice question, China narrowly led the United States, 52.0% to 48.0%. Japan remained the most trusted major power at 65.6%. Conclusions: Southeast Asian stakeholders recogn ize material power while remaining cautious about both major powers. Their preferred strategy is n ot binary alignment but stronger ASEAN capacity, cohesion, and diversified engagement. The force d-choice result measures a constrained hypothetical preference and should not be misrepresented as the region’s primary policy choice. Because the sample is purposive and policy-oriented, findings d escribe informed regional perceptions rather than population-representative public opinion.
References
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